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The FBI’s Fitness Tests and Title VII—Does Gender Equality
Require Lowering Standards?
BY DYLAN TUCKER*
INTRODUCTION
Many careers require specific abilities, ranging from intellectual to physical.
Thus, prior to entry into a given position, employers often train and/or test new
recruits to ensure that they have the requisite abilities to perform the job or
complete training without injury. Gender-norming is a process by which
employers allow an applicant’s sex to impact their scores on an employment test.1
This norming is used to account for the inherent differences between the sexes.
However, because such norming is likely to violate Title VII, agencies that
implement gender-norming standards in their employment testing often adopt
these tests as a mechanism to determine overall fitness, rather than establish
gender-normed abilities as a minimum requirement necessary to do the job.
In 2009, the FBI held a 22-week new agent training program (“NATP”) in
Quantico, Virginia, which set out not only to prepare new agents for their new
careers in the FBI, but also to limit injury during the physical training.2 The NATP
subjected new agent trainees (“NAT”) to a physical fitness test (“PFT”), to ensure
that the trainees were at a sufficient overall fitness level.3 After failing to
successfully complete the push-up requirement, where male NATs were required
to perform more push-ups than female NATs, Jay Bauer filed a Title VII action
against the Attorney General.4 The primary claim was that the gender-normed
standards of the PFT were facially discriminatory under two Title VII provisions.5
At trial, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.6 The district
court agreed that the physical fitness test was facially discriminatory, relying
heavily on the “simple test” outlined in City of Los Angeles Department of Water &
Power v. Manhart as well as the plain language of Title VII.7 However, on appeal,
Copyright © 2017 by Dylan Tucker
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1. Alan Andrews & Julie Risher, What does THAT have to do with being a cop?, AELE.ORG (Oct. 14,
2006), http://www.aele.org/andrews2006.pdf.
2. So Close Yet So Far: One Failed Push Up Has Potential to Change FBI’s Fitness Test, ABA.ORG (Feb.
22, 2016), https://apps.americanbar.org/ababoards/blog/blogpost.cfm?threadid=32832&catid=14913.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), 2000e-2(1).
6. Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 850 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Bauer v. Lynch, 812
F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016).
7. Id. at 855–56.
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the court vacated and remanded the district court’s decision due to a perceived
error in legal analysis.8 The Fourth Circuit held that the question to consider on
remand was whether the PFT, in light of inherent physiological differences, placed
an “unequal burden” on an individual based on sex.9 Subsequently, on remand,
the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the FBI,
reasoning that the PFT did not impose an “unequal burden” on male NATs.10
Part I will discuss Title VII and relevant case law dealing with gender-normed
standards and testing. This section will outline the “simple test” used by some
courts in gender-norming cases. The examination will focus on how courts look
exclusively to the plain language used in Title VII and rely on “formal equality” to
determine whether a policy is discriminatory. Moreover, examination of the
“simple test” will underscore the lens through which the district court in Bauer v.
Holder viewed the facts and will explore the implications of analyzing gendernormed fitness testing policies in this way. Part I will also discuss the origins and
uses of the alternative “unequal burden” analysis employed by several courts,
including the Fourth Circuit in Bauer v Lynch. This approach avoids interpreting
Title VII as disallowing all differential standards outright, but rather interprets
Title VII as disallowing differential standards that place “unequal burdens” on an
individual based on sex.
Next, Part II will fully outline the facts and procedural history of Bauer as well
as underline the arguments asserted by both parties at the district court and
appeals court levels. Part III will provide an analysis of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling,
and the implications it will have moving forward. Specifically, the focus will lie on
the ambiguity left by the Fourth Circuit in how to define and analyze the term
“burden” in gender-normed fitness testing cases. Additionally, this part will
discuss the outcome of the case on remand and how that outcome could ease
liability concerns for other employers. Lastly, Part IV will conclude with a
summary of the article and a discussion on the possible future implications that
the holding of Bauer might have for gender-based employment testing.
I. TITLE VII AND SEX
Established in 1964, Title VII protects against unlawful discrimination in the
employment context by mandating that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting
employees or applicants for employment . . . shall be made free from any
discrimination based on . . . sex.”11 In efforts to further increase employee
protections, Title VII was amended through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, stating
that “discriminatory use of test scores” as well as use of “different cutoff scores”
for different groups on “employment related tests” is strictly forbidden.12 Courts
have recognized two variations of discrimination—disparate impact and disparate
treatment. The focus of this paper will remain with the latter. Disparate treatment
8. Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d at 351–52.
9. Supra note 2.
10. Bauer v. Sessions, No. 1:13 –cv–93 WL 2311748, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Va. May 25, 2017).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, TIT. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)).
12. Fourth Circuit Applies “Unequal Burdens” Analysis to Gender-Normed Fitness Test, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2257, 2257 (June 10, 2016).
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occurs when an employer’s policy facially discriminates against certain employees
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13 Moreover, while
evidence of discriminatory motive is important to a disparate treatment claim,
such a motive can sometimes be inferred from the simple fact of difference in
treatment:14 “[W]hether an employment practice involves disparate treatment
through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer
discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination.”15
The issue that arises in Bauer is whether unlawful disparate treatment
automatically arises when males and females are required to meet different marks
(for example, thirty push-ups versus fourteen push-ups), or if reaching different
marks may nevertheless represent the same level of achievement. In other words,
the courts grapple with interpreting Title VII to require formal equality (requiring
men and women to perform the same number of push-ups), or interpreting it in a
way that allows for a more pragmatic understanding of equality through
consideration of inherent physiological differences between sexes.
A. Foundational Cases
1. The “Simple Test”
While Bauer presents a relatively novel situation—gender-normed standards
for employment fitness tests—there are several cases that helped lay the
foundation for how the district court and court of appeals analyzed this case. The
“simple test” for determining discrimination under Title VII was developed in
Manhart.16 This case involved a class action filed on behalf of female employees,
contending that the employer’s requirement that female employees make larger
contributions to its pension fund than male employees violated Title VII.17 The
employer used mortality tables showing that females lived longer than males, and
thus made females contribute extra based on the assumption that it would be more
costly to cover their retirement.18 The Court noted that while relying on sex
stereotypes to make employment decisions is unlawful under Title VII, this case
presented a different situation.19 That is, it was a fact that women, as a class, lived
longer than men.20 Importantly, however, the Court reasoned that not all women
in the class will live longer than every male employee, and therefore, it is unlawful
to make gender-based policies based on average lifespan differences. In making
its determination, the Court employed a “simple test,” looking at the plain
language of Title VII and the legislative intent: “such a practice does not pass the
simple test of whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner

13. Elements and burdens of proof—Disparate treatment and disparate impact distinguished, OH. EMPL.
PRAC. L. § 19:2 (2016).
14. Id.
15. Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 856 (E.D. Va. 2014) (quoting Int’l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991)).
16. See generally Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
17. Id. at 705.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 707.
20. Id.
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which but for that person’s sex would be different.”21 In other words, the simple
fact that females were being treated unequally pointed to a violation of Title VII.
Moreover, the court felt that no further analysis was needed and the fact that
females, on average, lived longer than males made no difference to the
determination.
Although the facts in Manhart are not on point with the facts in Bauer, the
Court nevertheless provided a framework with which to interpret and apply Title
VII in cases where employers treat male and female employees differently based
on identifiable differences between them. As such, when examining the facts in
Bauer, the district court analogized the FBI’s claim that different push-up
requirements were needed because of the inherent differences between the sexes
to the “life-expectancy” rationale used by the employer in Manhart. Under this
more formal approach to equality, the district court was able to avoid considering
physiological differences between the sexes, and instead stopped the analysis at
the simple fact that men and women needed different scores to pass the PFT.
2. “Unequal Burdens”
Providing some nuance to the “simple test,” however, Gerdom v. Continental
Airlines, Inc. established the “unequal burdens” test for Title VII violations. Here,
flight attendants were required to remain under a certain weight in order to
maintain employment.22 For example, an attendant five feet two inches tall could
weigh no more than 114 pounds.23 Moreover, all flight attendants were weighed
once a month to make sure they met the weight requirement.24 If an attendant was
overweight, she would be required to lose two pounds per week.25 Failing to do
so would lead to suspension and eventually termination.26 The majority held that
the plaintiffs could show that they had been treated discriminatorily due to their
sex if, upon remand, they could establish that men similarly situated had not been
subjected to comparable burdens.27 Thus, here, the court emphasized the fact that
different may not mean unequal, as there are inherent distinctions between the
sexes. As such, the true measure of discrimination in these types of cases is the sexbased burdens that employment policies place on employees.
The desire to limit discrimination is a central tenant of the modern judicial
system. However, tension arises when courts must balance the seemingly plain
and strict language of Title VII with the often complex nature of inter-gender
differences. Employing the “simple test” allows courts to bypass considerations
about physical differences between men and women, holding gender-normed
physical fitness tests facially discriminatory. However, the “unequal burdens” test
allows courts to take a more substantive approach to equality, by providing a
mechanism to take note of identifiable differences between men and women. Such
approaches make room for gender-normed physical fitness testing, so long as they
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 711.
Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 605.

MACRO FINAL FINAL (Do Not Delete)

1/10/2018 6:54 PM

THE FBI’S FITNESS TESTS AND TITLE VII

47

pose no greater burden on either sex. This tension between following the arguably
plain and strict language of Title VII and acknowledging that different standards
may be necessary to avoid true discrimination lies at the center of Bauer litigation.
B. The FBI’s History of Similar Tests and Litigation
While few cases touch on the precise issue outlined in Bauer, the FBI has faced
litigation over the PFT before. In Powell v. Reno, a male NAT also alleged that the
different physical fitness standards in the NATP were facially discriminatory
towards men.28 The plaintiff asserted that he might have passed the PFT if the FBI
did not have gender-normed performance standards.29 However, the court
disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that the different standards violated Title
VII.30 The court, relying on Gerdom, held that Title VII allows employers to make
distinctions based on inherent and clearly identifiable physical differences
between men and women.31 In other words, gender-normed policies where “no
significantly greater burden of compliance was imposed on either sex” are
permissible under Title VII.32 The court went on to note that its decision is rooted
in Supreme Court precedent. The court cites Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, noting that it “has consistently upheld statutes where the gender
classification . . . realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances.”33 Moreover, for further support, the court
looked to dicta in United States v. Virginia, which underscored the idea that
admission of women to the previously all-male Virginia Military Institute would
require the school to “adjust aspects of the physical training programs.”34
The court in Powell reasoned that men and women are not “similarly
situated” physically.35 Keeping this in mind, men and women at equal fitness
levels may nevertheless perform differently on physical fitness tests. For example,
the court notes that women have, on average, less upper body strength than men.36
As such, women may not be able to perform the same number of push-ups as
men—at least not without extra time or training.37 After taking these differences
into account, the court deemed that the requirements for males were comparably
equal and no more burdensome than those for females.38
In addition to Powell, the FBI faced yet another allegation in Hale v. Holder—a
proceeding before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.39 Here,
similar to in Powell, the plaintiff was a male NAT and also failed to satisfy the PFT

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Powell v. Reno, No. 96-2743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24169, at *9 (D.D.C. July 24, 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9–10.
Gerdom 692 F.2d at 606.
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550–51 n.19 (1996).
See Powell, No. 96-2743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24169, at *9–11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hale v. Holder, No. 570-2007-00423x (E.E.O.C. Sept. 20, 2010).
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standards.40 Plaintiff alleged that the FBI held female trainees to a lower physical
standard than the male trainees, thus violating Title VII.41 However, the
administrative law judge disagreed, adopting the approach taken by
the Powell court. The judge emphasized the basic physical differences between the
genders, and held that the FBI’s recognition of those differences does not violate
Title VII.42 Moreover, the judge found that the PFT was not unequally burdensome
because it, “(1) screened out individuals of both genders who were not sufficiently
fit to safely perform the duties of [a Special Agent]; and (2) did not screen out
individuals of either gender who were sufficiently fit to safely perform as [a
Special Agent].”43
These cases, while not binding precedent, provided some guidance to the
district and appeals courts in Bauer. Moreover, while previous cases establish a
framework to analyze gender-norming cases, they do not provide a specific
outline for cases dealing with gender-normed physical fitness tests. As such,
Powell and Hale provide the best predictor of the analytical approach that future
courts will, and should, take.
II. BAUER V. LYNCH: FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Case Facts
In 2008, Jay Bauer applied to the FBI, and passed the initial written tests and
background checks.44 However, in addition to the initial screening process, he was
also required to pass the PFT to gain entry to the NATP.45 One part of the PFT was
the push-up test, requiring male trainees to complete thirty push-ups and female
trainees fourteen push-ups.46 Although Bauer failed his first PFT, completing
twenty-five pushups, he passed the first test on his second try.47 Once he was
admitted to the NATP, he “passed all academic tests, demonstrated proficiency in
his firearms and defensive tactics training, and met all expectations for the
practical applications and skills components of the Academy.”48 However, despite
his training successes, he failed the second PFT, completing 29 out of 30 pushups.49 Subsequently, Bauer brought suit in the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging
that the FBI’s PFT represented sex-based cutoff scores, which violate Title VII.50

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Mikhail Petrov, FBI’s Physical Fitness Test Can Have Different Requirements for Men and
Women, WAKE FOREST L. REV. (Feb. 10, 2017), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/2016/02/fbis-personalfitness-test-can-have-different-standards-for-men-and-women/.
43. Hale v. Holder, No. 570-2007-00423x (E.E.O.C. Sept. 20, 2010).
44. Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 372 (2016).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 345.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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B. Physical Testing
The FBI requires new agents to have not only certain intellectual and
analytical abilities, but also physical abilities.51 To that end, the FBI administers
the NATP: a multi-week program which helps train agents to adequately perform
the duties required of their positions.52 Additionally, the program is designed to
ensure that agents are fit to participate throughout the training, beyond the initial
testing.53
According to the FBI, physical fitness training is vital to the program because
“a basic level of fitness and conditioning is essential for a NAT to perform at
his/her best in all aspects of training and to successfully complete the entire fastpaced training program without serious physical injury and undue mental
stress.”54 Additionally, “a NAT’s level of fitness serves as a foundation for his/her
ability to effectively apply principles and non-deadly force alternatives being
taught in the program.”55 In other words, the program in its current form was
developed because physically unfit trainees were increasingly sustaining injuries
during the training.56
When deciding which events to include in the PFT, the FBI relied on the
Cooper Institute and a panel of experts, consisting of Supervisory Special Agents
in the Training Division, who considered which events would most accurately and
effectively measure the overall fitness needed to safely train for and perform the
physical tasks of the training and job.57 Moreover, the FBI conducted a study with
322 subjects from seven NATP classes to decide upon an appropriate minimum
passing score. Given the observed differences in physical abilities between male
and female trainees, the FBI enacted gender-normed standards, with the intention
of holding both genders to equal standards of overall fitness.58
Lastly, it is interesting to note that from 2004 to 2012, less than one percent of
all trainees failed to pass the PFT, and there was no statistically significant
difference in the passing rates for men and women.59 However, in regard to the
pass points for push-ups specifically, if the thirty push-up standard for males was
used to test both genders, females would be over seven times more likely to fail in
any one attempt to pass the PFT.60
C. District Court Opinion
At trial, Bauer brought forth the argument that the FBI discriminated against
male NATs by requiring them to do more push-ups than females to pass the PFT.
The district court relied on two provisions to guide its analysis. 42 U.S.C.A. §

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Brief for Appellant at 7, Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (2016) (No. 14-2323).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.; supra note 2.
Brief for Appellant at 7, Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (2016) (No. 14-2323).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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2000e-2(a)(1) provides that:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .”

Additionally, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (l) states:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with
the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion,
to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results
of, employment related tests on the basis of . . . sex.”

Agreeing with the plaintiff’s arguments, the district court looked next to the
Supreme Court for guidance on how to analyze this relatively novel issue. The
court analogized Bauer to Manhart and UAW v. Johnson Controls.61 In Manhart, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that while there are physical differences between
males and females (average lifespan, for example), this did not serve as an
adequate justification for the differential treatment with respect to payments into
a pension fund.62 Thus, the Court held that disparate treatment discrimination
may exist even if it is based on a “generalization that [is] unquestionably true.”63
Moreover, to make this determination, the Court applied a “simple test” that
makes a discrimination finding turn on “whether the evidence shows treatment of
a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.”64
Next, in Johnson Controls, an employer created a policy barring female
employees capable of bearing children from jobs with a risk of lead exposure. The
Supreme Court held that, even though the ability to have children is a clear
physiological difference between the sexes, the policy was nevertheless facially
discriminatory because it “create[d] a facial classification based on gender.”65 The
“simple test” applied in these cases highlight the courts’ formal approach to
equality: individual physical characteristics are irrelevant when making
employment decisions, unless they are considered a bona fide occupational
qualification.66 Thus, after comparing these cases to Bauer, this district court found
that “the PFT clearly falls within § 2000e–2(a)(1)’s prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of sex: plaintiff was treated in a manner which but for
his sex would have been different.”67

61. Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 857 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Bauer v. Lynch, 812
F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016).
62. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) (describing
general differences between men and women).
63. Id. at 707.
64. Id. at 711.
65. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991).
66. The Ideas of Equality and Non-Discrimination: Formal and Substantive Equality, EQUAL RIGHTS
TRUST, equalrightstrust.org (last visited Aug. 17. 2017).
67. Bauer v. Holder, 25 F. Supp. 3d 842, 855 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Bauer v. Lynch, 812
F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016).
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In addition to applying the “simple test,” the district court also considered
the arguments outlined by former Attorney General Holder. Specifically, the court
considered the “unequal burden” test underscored in Gerdom, Powell, and Hale.
However, the court could not see past the plain language of § 2000e–2(a)(1), which
made it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual’s . . . sex.”68 Because this language seems to make no accommodation
for physiological differences between men and women, the district court reasons
that the “unequal burden” test violates statutory mandate.69 Moreover, the court
contends that Gerdom directly contradicts the precedent set by Manhart.70 That is,
the formal approach to equality proscribed in Manhart will find that discrimination
exists when an individual is treated “in a manner which but for that person’s sex
would be different,” even if that differential treatment is based on a
“generalization that [is] unquestionably true.”71 As such, after the district court’s
determination that men and women are subject to any different requirements, the
inquiry effectively stops, as the policy is automatically discriminatory under Title
VII.
D. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
Unlike the district court, the court of appeals sought guidance from the
limited case law that is directly on point. Specifically, the court looked to Powell
and Hale, which specifically addressed, and approved of, the FBI’s use of gendernormed standards for the PFT. Moreover, the court notes that in those cases, the
judges relied heavily on Gerdom and the “unequal burden” test.72 Looking to
Powell, the court of appeals highlights that the court rejected the proposition that
female trainees had less stringent standards, and explained that “Title VII allows
employers to make distinctions based on undeniable physical differences between
men and women . . . where no significantly greater burden of compliance [is]
imposed on either sex.”73 Furthermore, because physiological differences between
the sexes “result in males and females of similar fitness levels performing
differently on physical tests,”74 the FBI’s gender-normed standards simply
accounted for those differences and, therefore, do not violate Title VII.
Additionally, in Hale, the plaintiff also contended that the FBI held females to less
rigorous physical requirements than males. The administrative law judge adopted
the approach taken by the Powell court and recognized that “distinctions based on
the obvious physical differences between men and women” do not per se violate
Title VII.75
Next, the court of appeals went to the root of the Powell and Hale decisions by
examining Gerdom. As opposed to the district court, the court of appeals seemingly
believed that the “unequal burdens” test could coincide with the plain language
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (1964).
Bauer, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 857.
Id.
See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978). ,
Bauer v. Holder, 812 F.3d 340, 348 (2016).
Powell v. Reno, No. 96-2743, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24169 at *10 (D.D.C. July 24, 1997).
Id. at 11.
Id.
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of sections §2000e-2(a)(1) and §2000e-2 (l); that is, that the FBI’s PFT does not lower
the standards for women or raise the standards for men. Instead, the test measures
overall fitness, and therefore treats men and women equally given their
measurable physical differences. In fact, if the FBI were to have equal push-up
requirements, women would suffer a disparate impact, as reaching thirty pushups is more burdensome for females. Moreover, if the bar were lowered, requiring
both males and females to reach fourteen push-ups, women would still face a
higher burden because men would not need to achieve the same level of overall
fitness as women. Thus, the court of appeals departed from the district court’s
formal approach to equality, and instead applied a substantive approach wherein
a policy is judged on its ability to grant equal outcomes for disadvantaged
groups.76 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the FBI’s gender-normed
physical fitness benchmarks did not violate Title VII because they imposed equal
burdens of compliance on men and women.77
III. DECISION ON REMAND
A. Resolving Ambiguity Left by Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit instructed the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia to consider whether the gender-normed standards impose an “unequal
burden” on male and female NATs. The FBI was successful in showing that the
PFT “impose[s] an equal burden of compliance on both men and women,
requiring the same level of physical fitness of each,”78 thus leading the court to
grant summary judgment in favor of the FBI.
The court’s reasoning helps establish a new standard for cases involving
physical fitness employment tests. The Fourth Circuit, however, left ambiguous
the process by which courts should interpret “burden.” In other words, whether
“burden” should be examined in terms of economic, physical, or emotional
hardships (or a culmination of all three) was left unclear.79 For example, when
employment policies require male and female employees to maintain different
grooming standards, the time, cost, and overall effort required to meet those
standards are the considerations used in examining the relative burdens for each
gender.80 Similarly, in the context of physical fitness testing, the burden imposed
by the PFT could be examined by looking at the time and effort spent practicing
push-ups, the cost of joining a gym or hiring a trainer, and the emotional
expenditure needed to reach the requirements of the PFT.81 Thus, the lower court’s
reasoning helps resolve the ambiguity left by the Fourth Circuit, and sets a new
standard of analysis for future courts.
On remand, the court did not openly discuss the ambiguity inherent in
defining the term “burden.” The court, however, nevertheless underscored what
approach it was taking: a statistical analysis of pass rates. The court notes that
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Supra note 66.
Bauer v. Holder, 812 F.3d 340, 348–49 (2016).
Id. at 351.
Id.
Supra note 12.
Id.
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Bauer’s argument fails because “[t]he only reliable way to attempt to select
equivalent, gender-normed standards on a pushup test is to rely on metrics such
as percentile ranks, based on either large databases or specific datasets. That is
precisely what the FBI did here.”82 Thus, the court held that the studies conducted
and relied upon by the FBI – which show that from 2004 to 2012, ninety-nine
percent of both men and women passed the PFT (with no statistically significant
difference between the sexes) – were sufficient to show that Bauer was not
unequally burdened by the PFT.83
This analysis of how to define “burden” is perhaps the most clear-cut solution
to the ambiguity. Relying exclusively on data-metrics provides clarity for future
employers and courts on how to judge whether an employment fitness policy is
discriminatory. Although objective statistical measures likely require employers
to hire outside consultants or research analysts to ensure that the fitness
requirements lead to equal outcomes, such criteria promotes consistency in the
courts. As such, the district court’s ruling underscores a reasonable interpretation
of “burden,” and provides clear standards for establishing equal burdens.
B. Easing Liability for Employers with Physical Fitness Requirements
When implementing policy, employers sometimes face a Title VII “catch-22.”
Employer action or inaction may result in discrimination allegations by a
particular group; however, the alternative action is likely to disparately impact
another group. In Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), for example, the Supreme
Court held that the New Haven Fire Department’s decision to throw out the results
of a promotion test because minority candidates scored lower than white
candidates violated Title VII. However, the Court noted that such action would be
permissible if the employer could “demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that,
had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.”84 While a disparate impact claim was not made in Bauer, the district
court’s ruling nevertheless eases liability for employers who would otherwise be
(1) faced with disparate-impact allegations arising from fitness standards that do
not account for gender, or (2) forced to mount a Ricci defense when sued for having
gender-normed fitness standards.
If, upon remand, the district court had ruled that the FBI’s gender-normed
PFT created unequal burdens, and therefore violates Title VII, employers would
be forced to amend fitness policies to require men and women to achieve identical
scores. Such policies subject employers to disparate-impact liability, as women, on
average, are unable to meet the same physical fitness standards as men. As such,
by declaring that gender-normed fitness standards do not violate Title VII, so long
as statistical data suggests equal burdens, the court avoids a future string of Ricci
cases.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit set a new standard of analysis for gender-normed fitness
testing, departing from the reasoning of the district court. With scarce case law on
point, the district court in Bauer v. Holder relied on plain-meaning statutory
interpretation to determine that the FBI’s gender-normed PFT was discriminatory.
The “simple test” used by the lower court highlighted a formal approach to
equality, deemphasizing considerations of the physiological differences between
men and women. While the district court did not suggest that the FBI should have
no fitness standards at all,85 nor that there exist better ways to determine fitness
levels than gender-normed testing,86 the district court nevertheless ruled in favor
of the plaintiff, concluding that Title VII clearly and strictly forbids this type of
testing. In other words, the district court took a rigid interpretive approach,
asserting that discrimination occurs when there is any difference in physical
fitness requirements—and that difference is based on sex.
However, the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by this argument. Instead,
the court of appeals contended that case law supports the idea that inherent
physiological differences may require different standards for men and women.
Furthermore, the court’s analysis pointed to the assertion that true equality is
substantive equality. That is, a policy is not discriminatory if it allows equal
outcomes without imposing an unequal burden on a particular group.
On remand, the district court was tasked with interpreting what the Fourth
Circuit meant by “unequal burdens.” The court embraced a quantitative approach,
relying primarily on pass-rate statistics to determine whether thirty push-ups for
men represented the same burden as fourteen push-ups for women. Bauer
provides newfound precedent for cases involving gender-normed fitness testing,
and establishes a new standard of analysis for such cases. First, the Fourth Circuit
does away with the “simple test” for analyzing gender-normed fitness standards,
and contends that the “unequal burdens” analysis is appropriate for such cases.
Next, on remand, the district court lays out a method for defining “burden.” That
is, the district court relies on statistical data of pass rates between sexes, and uses
it as evidence of equal or unequal burdens.
Lastly, Bauer eases liability for employers with gender-normed fitness standards by reasoning that
such standards do not pose unequal burdens so long as they are supported by statistical data.
Ruling in the alternative would have prompted employers to adjust policies to require
universal standards. Such policies would inevitably prompt disparate-impact allegations due
to the physiological differences between the sexes. Thus, employers would be forced to (1)
subject themselves to disparate-impact liability, or (2) mount a Ricci defense when sued for
having gender-normed fitness standards. Bauer establishes the “unequal burdens” test as the
appropriate test to use for employment-based fitness testing cases, and clarifies that statistical
data is sufficient to demonstrate equal or unequal burdens.

85.
86.

Brief for Appellant at 7, Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (2016) (No. 14-2323).
Id.

